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Introduction  
Congratulations to the Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law on a remarkable symposium regarding collective 
security structures and atrocity prevention.2 While Ambassador 
Wenaweser wrestled with practical realities of U.N. Security Council 
reform and the efforts lead by his delegation to craft and see adopted a 
new code of conduct for Security Council practice,3 and Professor 
Trahan discussed legal challenges underway,4 this article considers 
structural impediments to atrocity prevention that are baked into the 
U.N. Charter and proposes structural reforms designed to alleviate 
such. 
 
1. Professor of Law and Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law at 
Creighton University.  This essay is an update and revision of his prior 
article, U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A New Proposal 
for a Twenty-First Century Council, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 320 (2000). 
Professor Kelly serves on the Board of Directors of L’Association 
Internationale de Droit Pénal, a Paris-based society of international 
criminal law scholars and jurists founded in 1924 that enjoys consultative 
status with the United Nations. Special thanks to Matthew Little for 
superb research assistance on this paper. 
2. Todd Buchwald & Jody Aremband, Foreward: Atrocity Prevention: The 
role of International Law and Justice, 52 CASE W. RES. J. OF INT’L L.  
(2020).  
3. Christian Wenaweser & Sina Alavi, Innovating to Restrain the Use of 
Veto in the United Nations Security Council, 52 CASE W. RES. J. OF INT’L 
L.  (2020).  
4. Jennifer Trahan, Questioning Unlimited Veto Use in the Face of Atrocity 
Crimes, 52 CASE W. RES. J. OF INT’L L.  (2020). 
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The question presented at this forum is whether reforms can be 
undertaken to prevent Russia, China, Great Britain, the United States, 
and France-—the five permanent members of the Security Council 
(P5)5—from wielding (1) their veto power,6 or (2) more commonly, the 
threat of a veto,7 to shield bad actors from collective security 
consequences when those actors commit atrocities.  Ready examples 
might include Russia shielding both Serbia for atrocities committed 
during the Balkan civil wars8 and Syria for atrocities committed during 
 
5. U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1.  
6. U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 3.  
7. Céline Nahory, The Hidden Veto, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (May 2004) 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/42656-the-hidden-
veto.html [https://perma.cc/P5KF-A2C6] (“Permanent members use the 
hidden veto mainly in closed-door informal consultations, rather than in 
official open meetings. Since the late 1980s, the Council largely conducts 
its business in such private sessions. Away from the public and without 
any record of what has been said, the P5 have more freedom to pressure, 
threaten, and even bully other members of the Council. By giving private 
veto warnings before a vote takes place, the P5 can “convince” Council 
members to shift their position and still persuade the international public 
of their good intentions.”).  
8. Reid Standish, Why Did Russia Veto Recognizing Srebrenica as a 
Genocide?, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 9, 2015, 5:39 PM) 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/09/why-did-russia-veto-recognizing-
srebrenica-as-a-genocide-putin-bosnia/ [https://perma.cc/X4JX-US94].  
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the Syrian civil war,9 and China shielding Sudan during the Darfur 
genocide.10 
Indeed, many in the international community believe that reform 
of the permanent membership is needed so badly that it has risen to 
the level being a near-existential matter.11  Jordanian prince and former 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein’s 
view is emblematic of that widely-shared perspective: 
al-Hussein decried the sense among some at the United Nations 
that the “pentarchy” of Britain, China, France, Russia and the 
United States “is running too much of the business.” He was 
alluding to the countries’ ability to veto resolutions in cases like 
alleged injustices in Syria’s war or by Israeli forces against 
Palestinians. “When they cooperate things can move; when they 
don’t everything becomes stuck and the organization in general 
becomes so marginal to the resolution of these sorts of horrific 
conflicts that we see,” Zeid said. “That has to change: In the end 
the organization can collapse at great cost to the international 
community. There is a sense that the permanent five have created 
a logjam by dint of their proclivity to use the veto, and the 
 
9. Louisa Loveluck, Russia Vetoes U.N. Resolution to Continue Syria 
Chemical Weapons Investigation, WASH. POST. (Oct. 24, 2017) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/russia-vetoes-un-
resolution-to-continue-syria-chemical-weapons-
investigation/2017/10/24/63e52470-b8c6-11e7-9b93-
b97043e57a22_story.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/H9H6-
JANY] (“Russia used its veto power on the . . . Security Council . . . to 
block an extension of efforts by international inspectors to determine who 
was behind chemical weapons attacks that have killed scores of Syrian 
civilians. Moscow’s veto decision was condemned by the United States, 
Britain and others as an attempt to shield the perpetrators from 
answering for the most controversial human rights abuses of Syria’s six-
year-old war. Western intelligence officials and U.N. investigators have 
blamed the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for the 
attacks. It was the ninth time Russia has used its veto to hinder 
international action on Syria. Moscow is a key ally of the Syrian 
government, supporting it militarily, politically and financially.”). In 
several instances Russia was joined by China in protecting Syria.  Graham 
Melling & Anne Dennett, The Security Council Veto and Syria: 
Responding to Mass Atrocities Through the “Uniting for Peace” 
Resolution, 57 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 285, 286 (2017).  
10. See generally Michael J. Kelly, Ending Corporate Impunity for Genocide: 
The Case Against China’s State-Owned Petroleum Company in Sudan, 
90 OR. L. REV. 413 (2011).  
11. See, e.g., Jamey Keaten, UN Rights Chief Warns UN Could ‘Collapse’ 
Without Change, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 20, 2018) 
https://www.apnews.com/ea1ea4fa7eb44284b5eca85dec42c43d 
[https://perma.cc/EL5P-42AN].  
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paralysis — less so the U.K. and France — but of course, the 
U.S., Russia and China quite frequently”. . . .12 
Of course, any discussion of Security Council reform immediately 
runs into two vexing issues, either of which are potentially negatively 
dispositive.  First is the problem of politics.  None of the P5 wish to 
meaningfully discuss alteration in their status or power in the first 
instance and, in the second instance, are wary of discussing reforms 
that would tend to diffuse or diminish said power – such as expanding 
the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) in general or permanent membership 
in particular.13  Consequently, any reform would have to dampen 
perceived threats to the P5 while simultaneously reassuring them of 
their influence.14 Antagonistic jockeying among candidates for 
permanent seats only complicates matters further: “[B]eyond the idea 
of expansion, any consensus falls apart, with fierce regional rivalries 
over who might gain new permanent seats making any change 
problematic, if not impossible.”15 
Second is the problem of amendment. No structural reform can be 
implemented without opening the Charter to amendment16 – a prospect 
 
12. Id.  
13. “Meaningfully” is used purposefully here.  Several P5 members have 
endorsed individual candidates to join the council when it has been 
politically expedient for them to do so, knowing full well that actual 
movement in this direction is unlikely, or for other reasons such as irking 
another member of the P5. See Sheryl Gay Storberg & Jim Yardley, 
Countering China, Obama Backs India for U.N. Council, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 8, 2010) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/09prexy.html, 
[https://perma.cc/G572-ZB59]; see also Bardo Fassbender, On the 
Boulevard of Broken Dreams: The Project of a Reform of the UN Security 
Council after the 2005 World Summit, 2 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 391 (2005) 
(discussing the intractability of reform efforts).  
14. Jan Wouters & Tom Ruys, Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a 
New Century?, Egmont Paper no. 9, at 1, 20 (Aug. 2005), available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/8980/1/ep9.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD3Y-379N] 
(“[E]xpansion of the P-5 is unlikely to go smoothly. Indeed, proposals of 
this kind meet with fierce opposition from the main rivals of the four 
allied applicants: i.e. Italy (regarding Germany), Mexico and Argentina 
(regarding Brazil) and Pakistan (regarding India). Moreover, opinion on 
which or how many countries should get permanent seats remains 
divided.”).  
15. Neil MacFarquhar, Change Will Not Come Easily to the Security Council, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/09nations.html, 
[https://perma.cc/ZK5D-2Y6X].  
16. See Luisa Blanchfield, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Rep. No. RL33848, United 
Nations Reform: Background and Issues for Congress 13 (2015).  
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fraught with dangers, not the least of which includes a very long line of 
proposed amendments17 to almost every aspect of the United Nations 
in addition to potentially contentious legislative battles in the 
parliamentary assemblies of member states.   
Amending the UN Charter is an onerous process, requiring not 
only approval of two-thirds of the UNGA, but also ratification of 
the relevant domestic legislation by two-thirds of UN member 
states (including all of the P5). . . .  Amending the charter faces 
a multitude of obstacles, not least within the U.S. Congress. Any 
UN Charter amendment would require bipartisan backing on 
Capitol Hill. At present, support in Congress for the United 
Nations is irresolute . . . .18 
Consequently, any resolution to amend would need to be crafted 
narrowly to encompass only those articles of the Charter implicated in 
achieving the envisioned structural adjustment, much as was the case 
with the 1965 UNSC expansion.19 That was the last time Security 
Council expansion was undertaken; that instance was an effort to reflect 
the new world order forming in the wake of the global decolonization 
process by adding more geographic diversity to the council through 
more non-permanent seats.20  
While not insurmountable, the realities of both problems must be 
addressed if any forward momentum can be achieved.  That said, this 
discussion does not wholly encompass strategies for tackling those 
issues.  Rather it focuses on presenting the best options for restructuring 
that, taken together, provide the most effective outcome for a re-
energized and more transparent Security Council. This reformed 
Security Council might be less inclined to forego appropriate security 
responses to the commission of atrocities around the globe no matter 
which permanent member’s client state committed them. 
I. Regional Reconfiguration of Permanent 
Membership 
No reform of the United Nations will be complete without reform 
of the Security Council. And, indeed, so long as the Council 
 
17. See id. at 15.  
18. Kara C. McDonald & Stewart M. Patrick, U.N. Security Council 
Enlargement and U.S. Interests, Council on Foreign Relations, Special 
Rep. No. 59, at 11 (Dec. 2010).  
19. See id. at 34–36.  
20. Bruce Russett, Security Council Expansion: Can’t, and Shouldn’t, in 
REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 153, 
153 (Mar. 2005).  
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remains unreformed, the whole process of transforming 
governance in other parts of the system is handicapped by the 
perception of an inequitable distribution of power . . . . The world 
has changed dramatically since 1945, and the Security Council 
must change, too. . . . 
 Secretary General Kofi Annan (2006)21 
 
Permanent membership on the Security Council comes with certain 
perks: no elections, immense influence, the ability to single-handedly 
defeat any resolution, and, until recently, a guaranteed seat on the 
International Court of Justice.22  Unlike resolutions of other U.N. 
bodies, UNSC resolutions carry the force of international law as binding 
obligations that members agree through the charter to comply with,23 
even to the detriment of other international obligations they may 
have.24  Consequently, the P5’s power to positively or negatively affect 
not only the creation of international law but also its implementation 
is enormous. 
At the Charter’s inception in 1945,25 this made some sense.  As the 
institutional replacement to the League of Nations, which failed as a 
collective security paradigm to prevent the Second World War,26 the 
Allies designed the United Nations to be a body imbued with the ability 
to collectively assess threats to international peace and deploy military 
force to protect or restore it.27 They lodged this war-making power in 
 
21. Need for Security Council Reform is Greater Than Ever, Says Annan as 
He Urges Action, UN NEWS (Sept. 21, 2006), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2006/09/193132-need-security-council-
reform-greater-ever-says-annan-he-urges-action [https://perma.cc/SC8T-
MZT2].  
22. Until 2017, there was an informal understanding that the P5 would always 
fill one of the 15 seats on the ICJ, when the British judge, Christopher 
Greenwood, was not re-elected to the ICJ. See International Court of 
Justice: UK Abandons Bid for Seat on U.N. Bench, BBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-42061028 
[https://perma.cc/CV7C-MYMR].  
23. U.N. Charter art. 25. 
24. U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations 
under the present Charter shall prevail.”). 
25. Charter of the United Nations, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/charter-
united-nations/, [https://perma.cc/Q9QY-UAGY].  
26. Schott Michael Rank, Why Did the League of Nations Fail?, HISTORY ON 
THE NET (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.historyonthenet.com/why-did-
the-league-of-nations-fail [https://perma.cc/Z9JU-JQNN].  
27. U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.  
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the Security Council and put themselves in charge of it.28  This was a 
reflection of the old colonial paternalistic mindset of “who knows best,” 
still quite prevalent in that period, but it also reflected the near 
monopoly on military and economic power by the great powers of the 
day.29 
Much has changed in the 73 years since that bargain was struck.  
Two of the P5 seats of the original members are now filled by successor 
states: The Soviet Union’s seat to Russia and the Republic of China’s 
seat to the People’s Republic of China.30  In 1946 there were 51 states 
in the world; today there are 194.31  At that time, France and Britain 
controlled much of the territory in Africa and Asia through colonial 
subjugation.32 During the Cold War, the P5 had a monopoly on nuclear 
weapons;33 today other states have them (India, Pakistan, North Korea, 
Israel),34 had them and gave them up (South Africa),35 or are developing 
them (Iran).36 The P5 also embodied the largest economies of the 
world.37  While the United States and China remain the top two 
 
28. See id.  
29. See Ashley Purcell Goad, Mind the Gap: Navigating the Pitfalls of Cross-
Cultural Partnership (Feb. 2016) (unpublished Dissertation, George Fox 
Evangelical Seminary) available at 
https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128
&context=dmin [https://perma.cc/LQ3T-YRKH ] (exemplifying the 
paternalistic mindset’s continued existence).  
30. United Nations Security Council, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Jul. 20, 
1998), https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Security-
Council [https://perma.cc/8ADN-DG8M].  
31. Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present, U.N., 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-
membership-1945-present/index.html [https://perma.cc/49CL-P88U].  
32. See Jeannette L. Nolen, Decolonization, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 
(Feb. 20, 2009), https://www.britannica.com/topic/decolonization 
[https://perma.cc/5DTH-9X4G].  
33. Andre Munro, Nuclear Proliferation, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Sep. 
14, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/nuclear-proliferation 
[https://perma.cc/LYE3-9NYH].  
34. Id.  
35. Id.  
36. See Lara Seligman, How Close Is Iran to a Nuclear Bomb, Really?, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (July 1, 2019), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/01/how-close-is-iran-to-a-nuclear-
bomb-really/ [https://perma.cc/GGD3-NA8A].  
37. See AMIT K. BANERJEE & MURARI R. SHARMA. REINVENTING THE UNITED 
NATIONS 24 (2007),  
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economies, Japan and Germany are next, followed by Britain.38  France 
is no longer in the top 5, falling into the sixth spot, and Russia isn’t 
even in the top 10, lagging behind India, Italy, Brazil, and Canada.39 
“When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the seven largest Western 
economies—three of which have permanent seats on the council—
accounted for 51 percent of global economic output. Today they 
account for only 30 percent.”40 
Thus, any political, military, and economic rationales of P5 
membership that may have made sense in 1946, have all but 
evaporated.  Indeed, what the world is left with is an increasingly 
anachronistic power structure that is not diverse (geographically, 
ethnically, or religiously), and therefore not representative of the world 
today.  Together with the potential for arbitrary use of power through 
the veto, this reality harms the Security Council’s legitimacy.  If 
analogized to a constitution of global order, and there is much reason 
to believe that not only the framers of the Charter regarded it as such 
but also that many currently view it as such,41 then restructuring a key 
feature of the United Nations organic operational system is a new 
constitutional moment – albeit not as a big a moment at the 
organizations creation, but an important one nonetheless.42  In this case, 
a constitution is a social compact among states that agree to a set of 
rules for conducting themselves and reflects the shared values and 
aspirations of those states.43 When a constitution ceases to adequately 
do so, then it should be flexible enough to evolve (e.g. in the U.S. via 
amendment or judicial or statutory interpretation), otherwise, it 
legitimacy continues to erode. 
 
38. See Caleb Silver, Top 20 Economies in the World, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/ 
[https://perma.cc/WPT3-JPCC].  
39. GDP, The World Bank (2018), 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd?most_recent_val
ue_desc=true [https://perma.cc/5U6N-FNPN ] (containing the World 
Bank ranking of states by GDP as of 2018).  
40. Stewart M. Patrick, Why is No One Talking About UNSC Reform 
Anymore?, WORLD POL. REV. (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27906/why-is-no-one-
talking-about-unsc-reform-anymore [https://perma.cc/QT3Y-QB4R].  
41. See Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of 
International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 568–84 
(1998).  
42. Id. at 577–81.  
43. Paul Lermack, The Constitution Is the Social Contract So It Must Be a 
Contract… Right? A Critique of Originalism as Interpretive Method, 33 
WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 1403, 1427 (2007). 
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Calls for expansion of the Security Council’s permanent 
membership have increased since the end of the Cold War.44  However, 
nothing has changed, due in large part to a general lack of agreement 
among the P5 on what such reform should look like.45  Many of those 
proposals urged doubling or tripling the size of the permanent members, 
some of which included equal veto powers, and all of which would have 
resulted in an unwieldy and even more ineffective and inefficient 
Security Council, thereby further undermining the goal of actual 
collective security.46  More reform proposals have been logged since the 
turn of the century, also displaying a wide variety of formulae.47 
 
44. See United Nations Security Council, supra note 30. 
45. Patrick, supra note 40; See also Melling & Dennett, supra note 9, at 287. 
46. David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the 
Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 573–74 (1993). 
47. See e.g., Ian Hurd, Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in 
UN Security Council Reform, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 199 (2008) 
(acknowledging the value of increased deliberation on UNSC, but 
remaining skeptical that increasing diversity of the Security Council will 
increase its legitimacy); Anna Spain, The U.N. Security Council’s Duty 
to Decide, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 320 (2013) (acknowledging impossibility 
of substantive reform, calling for procedural reform to UNSC to recognize 
three duties: (1) A duty to decide whether it will take action in response 
to a crisis (2) A duty to disclose the reasons why it is not taking action 
(3) A duty to consult those nations and people most affected by its 
decisions); Kamrul Hossain, The Challenge and Prospect of Security 
Council Reform, 7 REGENT J. INT’L L. 299 (2010) (advocating for two 
plans for UNSC expansion: one with new permanent seats and one with 
4-year repeatable seats; further recommending no expansion of veto 
power); Igor C. Bailen, In Search of a Southern Agenda, 77 PHIL. L. J. 
158 (2002–03) (noting that the global South is sorely underrepresented on 
the UNSC; recognizing that this problem is exacerbated by reform 
proposals that only add Germany and Japan as permanent members); 
Bart. M. J. Szewczyk, Variable Multipolarity and U.N. Security Council 
Reform, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J. 449 (2012) (Recognizing that legitimacy is 
a separate question from legality and advising against UNSC expansion, 
though noting that if expansion occurs, it should be limited to India and 
Japan absent vetoes; further proposing that de facto situational expansion 
should instead be achieved via dramatically increased communication 
with states prior to and during a crisis thereby increasing legitimacy 
without expansion); Sebastian Jodoin, Enhancing the Procedural 
Legitimacy of the U.N. Security Council: A Normative and Empirical 
Assessment, 17 SRI LANKA J. INT’L L. 1 (2005) (recommending a wide 
array of reforms for UNSC: (1) including Japan and Germany ,perhaps 
by replacing current permanent members; (2) creating intermediate level 
of membership; (3) eliminating or reducing the power of the veto (4) 
increasing importance of the contribution criterion in Council selection; 
(5) allowing for immediate reelection of council members; (6) eliminating 
permanent membership; (7) implementing judicial review of Security 
Council resolutions by the ICJ; (8) limiting closed door meetings of 
UNSC; (9) allowing UNGA questions to UNSC that require answers; (10) 
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A moderated approach would place the most obvious, and 
perpetually regarded, candidates (Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil) 
as permanent members of the UNSC alongside others that would yield 
greater diversity without undue expansion.  That can be achieved 
through the creation of rotating permanent seats that are anchored 
geographically.  Due to the existence of large-scale ethno-religious 
differences in each region, such a solution is needed to accommodate 
those interests.  If only the four perpetual candidates above were 
elevated, the council’s permanent membership would result in elevating 
the mostly Hindu state from a region that is mostly Muslim48 and 
elevating the mostly Portuguese state from a region that is mostly 
Spanish.49  The Arab/Black split in Africa wouldn’t even be addressed. 
To accomplish this restructuring, Russia, China, and the United 
States would need to be left intact on the P5.  However, there is room 
for accommodation with respect to Britain and France – both of which 
are more forward-looking states, less able to project military power than 
the other three, and are invested in notions of advancement for 
multilateral institutions.50  In fact, France appears particularly willing 
 
enforcing the UNSC’s reporting obligation to UNGA; (11) 
institutionalizing the practice of consulting with states not on the 
Council); Craig Hammer, Reforming the Security Council: Open Letter to 
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 261 (2002) 
(proposing a short-term course of action: leave P5 in place, create 5 new 
seats with vetoes for rotating 2-year terms for “middle powers,” leave non-
permanent seats in place; proposing a long-term course of action: remove 
veto power and end permanent seats altogether); Jessica Elbaz, 
International Stalemate: The Need for a Structural Revamp of the U.N. 
Security Council, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 211 (2016) 
(recommending to replace the veto with a composite majority vote or 
institute a veto override by majority vote of the UNSC for one or two 
vetoes; further recommending that membership be altered to 8 permanent 
seats and 19 nonpermanent seats allocated regionally).    
48. See Religion by Country 2019, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (Oct. 24, 
2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/religion-by-country/ 
[https://perma.cc/6V5R-ZSZA] (showing that Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and Bangladesh all consist of heavily Muslim population as well as the 
176 million Muslims in India).  
49. Will Brown, Why is Brazil the Only Portuguese-Speaking Country in 
South America?, JBI STUDIOS (Aug. 8. 2016), 
https://www.jbistudios.com/blog/why-is-brazil-the-only-portuguese-
speaking-country-south-america [https://perma.cc/A9VL-TXLU] (citing 
UN Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Aff. 2015 statistics).  
50. See Select Committee on Int’l Relations, UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting 
World Order, 2017–19, HL 250, at summary (UK); see also Press Release 
from France Diplomatie, United Nations Day (Oct. 24 2018), 
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/united-
nations/news/events-2018/article/united-nations-day-24-10-18 
[https://perma.cc/WF5X-VMR9]. 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
United Nations Security Council Permanent Membership and the Veto 
Problem  
111 
to embrace reform overall and limit veto use in the case of atrocities.51  
In a démarche released by the French Foreign Ministry on United 
Nations Day 2018, the French government stated, “France is in favor 
of reforming the Security Council to make it more representative and 
to limit the use of the veto when mass crimes are committed.”52 
Bringing the French and British into a shared seat with Germany to 
represent Europe would achieve the dual task of maintaining them on 
the council while also getting Germany onto the Security Council. 
This allows a new structure to emerge: Permanent membership 
would consist of Russia, China, the U.S. and one seat each for Europe, 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa that rotates every two years among 
three permanent members from that region.  This arrangement would 
expand permanent membership at any single sitting of the Security 
Council from 5 to 7, thereby avoiding the problem of too many 
permanent members all sitting at once and creating a further drag on 
efficiency. 
The Asian seat would be shared among Japan, India, and either 
Indonesia or Pakistan.  This arrangement achieves the goals of getting 
both Japan and India onto the council while also providing for periodic 
Muslim representation.  The Latin American seat would be shared 
among Brazil, Mexico, and either Argentina or Chile – simultaneously 
achieving the goal of elevating Brazil while also ensuring periodic 
representation from Spanish Latin America.  The African seat would 
be shared among South Africa, Egypt, and Kenya or Nigeria.  This 
accommodation places both the leaders of Saharan and Sub-Saharan 
Africa on the council while also recognizing the economic importance 
of regional influencers. 
In all four cases, the geographic rotating permanent seats bring new 
voices to the table with increased authority, reward the longstanding 
economic and military contributions regularly made by these 
candidates to the United Nations budget and peacekeeping operations, 
and recognize the historical leadership each state has undertaken in its 
respective region.  
II. A Procedural Solution to the Veto Problem 
Equity issues inevitably arise when discussion of permanent 
membership restructuring touches on the veto.  There is very little 
appetite for expanding the potential for veto usage on the council by 
adding new permanent members with this power intact.  Yet, to be 
fair, elevation of new members without any veto power creates a second 
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tier of less powerful permanent members.  The proposal herein manages 
a moderate accommodation of both views. 
Currently, the veto power held by the P5 is substantive in nature – 
it can be used anytime for any reason without explanation.53  If assent 
to a resolution is withheld, the matter is over.54 Any restraint in the 
use of the veto would have to be voluntary on the part of the P5 
member wielding it as the Charter imposes no such breaking 
mechanism.55 
The Charter makes no constraints on how often or for what 
reason the veto power may be used; nor does it create a 
framework of checks and balances or require accountability. Hans 
Kelsen identifies the drafters’ missed opportunity to restrict the 
negative effect of the veto: under Article 27 the voting procedure 
fails to distinguish between the ‘‘quasi-obligatory and 
discretionary functions’’ of the Security Council in the Charter, 
and Kelsen argues that the functions which the body ‘‘shall’’ 
perform could have required a simple majority and only those 
which it ‘‘may’’ perform could have required a qualified majority, 
so that the veto would only apply to the latter. In contrast, the 
Charter clearly affords all decision making by the Security 
Council the greatest discretion and the permanent members near 
complete control as a central plank of maintaining international 
security, with the notorious downside that, as Brierly notes, it 
‘has resulted in a system that can be jammed by the opposition’ 
of a single permanent member.56 
What is proposed here is creation of a veto power that is procedural 
in nature.  In other words, when one of the regional permanent members 
withholds assent to a measure, that is not the end of the matter. 
Instead, the issue is referred to a special session of the General Assembly 
for consideration – a majority vote in the Assembly after brief debate 
and without the possibility of amendment would determine the 
resolution’s vitality and return it to the Security Council for adoption 
or withhold it.  A procedural veto then may in fact become a 
substantive veto if a matter is defeated in the Assembly. 
 
53. UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto, SECURITY COUNCIL 
REPORT (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-
security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php [https://perma.cc/V7X8-
4ULS].  
54. See id.  
55. See id. 
56. Melling & Dennet, supra note 9, at 289 (citing Hans Kelsen, Organization 
and Procedure of the Security Council of the United Nations, 59 HARVARD 
L. REV. 1087, 1111 (1946); J. L. Brierly, The Covenant and the Charter, 
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Due to the different legislative sessions (the Security Council is 
always in session; the General Assembly is not),57 it may be the case 
that a special standing committee of the General Assembly is formed 
to consider such procedural vetoes.  Such a committee would need to 
be in session around the clock just as the Security Council and should 
be constituted in a geographically representative manner.  Indeed, 
permanent regional Security Council members not currently serving in 
their rotating seats could possibly find a seat in their “off years” on this 
committee.  Alternatively, the full General Assembly could consider 
procedural veto referrals if they occur while it is in session and the 
standing committee could do so when the Assembly is not in session. 
This structure yields the added benefit of increasing General 
Assembly involvement in security matters in a much more meaningful 
way.  It also creates more stakeholders in the “collective” prong of 
collective security by allowing participation in the decision-making 
process on important global issues. In some respects, this could be a 
realization of the impetus behind the Uniting for Peace Resolution. 
Adopted in 1950, General Assembly resolution 377(V) resolves that if 
the Security Council fails to exercise its responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security due to a lack of unanimity among the 
permanent members.58 In other words, due to a veto, the General 
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately and make 
recommendations to restore international peace and security, and shall 
be able to do so in emergency session if the matter arises while it is out 
of session.59  
With one exception, each new permanent member state filling a 
regional rotating seat would join the council with a procedural veto 
power.  The one exception would be Germany.  There is no possibility 
 
57. Leland Goodrich, Basic Principles and Purposes of the United Nations, 
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58. See G.A. Res. 377(V), Uniting for Peace (Nov. 3, 1950); see also Christian 
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of Great Britain or France giving up their substantive veto and there 
is equally no possibility of Germany joining the council on unequal 
footing60 – especially if it were sharing a seat with the other two. A 
wide array of views is held among the other candidates on the veto.  
Japan would not require a substantive veto to accompany its seat;61 
Brazil, Pakistan, and Chile agree that the veto should eventually be 
eliminated altogether;62  Mexico believes the veto should be restricted 
to Chapter VII issues only.63 
Consequently, the realpolitik involved with maneuvering two P5 
states into a shared seat with Germany together with Germany’s 
insistence on equality, means that the Europeans emerge as a favored 
region with more real power than the other regions.  While the inequity 
of this arrangement is unfortunate, it is a necessary accommodation in 
order to avoid the proliferation of more substantive veto possibilities.  
In fact, the possibility of a substantive veto being wielded any 
particular Security Council session is reduced under this plan from five 
to four, even though three procedural veto possibilities would be added. 
III. Veto Transparency Via an Explanatory 
Requirement 
If a permanent member of the Security Council wields its veto, 
whether the substantive or procedural variety, in an attempt to shield 
those who commit atrocities, an explanation should be forthcoming.  
Germany first resurrected this quite old notion of veto explanation in 
the 1990s when, after reunification, Berlin began making its case for 
permanent membership.64 Although it only encompassed the original 
veto power, not the procedural version proposed here, it applied to all 
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uses of veto.65  I would extend this notion to include procedural vetoes 
as well.  Whenever this unilateral and intensely undemocratic power is 
used, it should be accompanied by a rationale that explains not only to 
other members of the Security Council, but also to the entire 
membership of the United Nations, precisely why that permanent 
member was disposed to resort to this extreme measure. 
Within the framework of the text of the Charter, the underlying 
logic in this position rests in the nature of the fiduciary duty owed by 
the Security Council to the rest of the United Nations – a point of some 
dispute among scholars.66  The quid pro quo reflected in Articles 24 and 
25 of the Charter is that in exchange for the Security Council acting on 
behalf of the members in carrying out its powers to maintain 
international peace and security, the members agree to accept and carry 
out the Security Council’s decisions.67  If use of the veto by a permanent 
member is an aspect of a permanent member carrying out its duty and 
that member is acting on behalf of the members (which in classic veto 
usage, it has demonstrably not been so acting), then the members are 
entitled to an explanation of that usage. 
External to the Charter’s internal logic, some have advanced the 
idea that permanent members have a duty under international human 
rights law, specifically due process norms, as well as the Responsibility 
to Protect,68 to provide reasons for their votes.  That same argument 
would hold true for the veto as well. When the Security Council adopts 
resolutions, these are typically preceded in their published form with a 
long series of whereas clauses that justify the issuance of the resolution 
and that cite prior or other resolutions as a basis for action.69 A similar 
form could be used to accompany veto usage. 
Whatever the ultimate theoretical underpinning, a requirement to 
transparently provide the rationale for veto usage would likely dampen 
its frequency.  In fact, the same positive likely outcomes identified by 
those seeking rationales to accompany all Security Council votes are 
present with respect to vetoes alone as well: 
A duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security Council will 
rationalize the Council’s decision-making process and, ultimately, 
improve the quality of the adopted decisions. The reason for this 
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is threefold. First, if decision-makers have to justify their 
decisions, they are more likely to exchange information and 
expertise, to carefully assess the available evidence, to weigh the 
different positions, and to reflect on their choices before making 
a decision. This allows them to be more successful at finding the 
decision that is best suited for the case at hand. Second, under a 
duty to give reasons, decision-makers are more likely to adopt 
reasonable decisions because they need to persuade others, 
including those most affected by the decisions. Since others will 
be able to examine and assess the justifications provided by the 
decision-maker, selfish and immoral arguments as well as 
arguments based on prejudice are likely to be suppressed. Thus, 
only a limited range of reasons can be invoked in order to justify 
decisions. In particular, decision-makers have fewer options to 
adopt decisions that are based on self-interested reasons. . . . 
Third, decisions based on grounds that can be endorsed by others 
will in the long run lead to an improvement of decision-making 
in general. Future decision-makers are more likely to base their 
decisions on the non-self-interested reasons that antecedent 
decision-makers have given.70 
Alternatively, a fallback position would be the requirement of a 
“situational explanation” related to use of veto concerning a situation 
characterized by the existence of mass atrocities.71  In other words, if 
an explanation for veto usage is not forthcoming in all instances, it 
should at least be required when the veto is used in response to 
situations that involve atrocities.  A group of former diplomats referred 
to as “the Elders,” until recently led by former Secretary General Kofi 
Annan, maintains that in the first instance the veto should not be used 
or threatened to be used in these situations, but that if it is used, an 
explanation should be forthcoming.72 
Under the Elders’ proposal, where a permanent member does cast 
a veto in such cases then it is incumbent upon the member to 
explain, clearly and publicly, what alternative course of action 
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they propose as a credible and efficient way to protect the 
populations in question. This explanation, the Elders assert, 
‘must refer to international peace and security, and not to the 
national interest of the state casting the veto, since any state 
casting a veto simply to protect its national interests is abusing 
the privilege of permanent membership.’ Moreover, when one or 
more permanent members do feel obliged to cast a veto, and do 
provide such an explanation, the others must undertake not to 
abandon the search for common ground but to make even greater 
efforts to agree on an effective course of action.73 
The veto’s original conception during the Charter’s negotiation was 
that it would not be a self-interested tool.  “In the U.N. Charter 
negotiations in 1945, the Security Council’s permanent members, or P5, 
committed to not use the veto in situations in which they were involved. 
Over time, however, this has become the constant, if not almost 
exclusive, reason for the P5 using the veto.”74  If that were indeed the 
case, and the P5 exclusively used the veto for the advancement of the 
organization’s purposes, then there would be much less consternation 
about how it has historically been deployed.75 
Part and parcel of this original justification also rested on the idea 
that the P5 would be the ones deploying most of the troops needed to 
maintain international peace and security – yet another instance where 
reality has departed from the foundational bargain: 
The veto was originally agreed as a quid pro quo for these powerful 
states which had carried the heavy burden in World War II of fighting 
the Nazis and Japan on behalf of the international community.  As they 
stated in 1945, the P5 could not be expected “to assume the obligation 
to act” and especially “in consequence of a decision in which they had 
not concurred.” Yet, out of almost 100,000 soldiers and police deployed 
today in UN-led peace forces around the world, only 3.7 percent of them 
are provided by the P5, and a measly 0.24 percent or 239 soldiers and 
police by the U.S. and Russia. While the P5 pay financially for this 
common endeavor, their contribution to U.N. forces is much more 
treasure than blood.76 
Consequently, both of the 1946-era assumptions underlying (1) the 
veto’s use (not self-interested) and (2) the nationality make-up of 
deployed U.N. troops to maintain international peace and security 
 
73. Melling & Dennet, supra note 9, at 296.  
74. Scott Sheeran, The UN Security Council Veto is Literally Killing People, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2014, 2:09 PM) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/11/the-
un-security-council-veto-is-literally-killing-people/. 
[https://perma.cc/Z5M2-25EJ].  
75. See id.  
76. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
United Nations Security Council Permanent Membership and the Veto 
Problem  
118 
(resting disproportionately on the shoulders of the P5) have evaporated 
alongside the 1946-era rationales addressed above concerning which 
states should be permanent members. 
Conclusion 
Every time a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council casts 
a veto, or threatens to do so, to protect a client state committing 
atrocities, or perhaps to protect even themselves when they do so, the 
legitimacy of the UNSC is further eroded.  This erosion has been 
decades in the making as the U.N. has grown but the UNSC has long 
ceased to reflect the new power structures in the world today; however, 
this behavior quickens the pace of that erosion exponentially. A 
weakened Security Council weakens not only our entire global 
governance project but also the very collective security goal the United 
Nations was designed to effectuate. 
Taken together: reconfiguration of the UNSC’s permanent seats to 
include expansion and realignment with shared regional rotating seats, 
implementation of a procedural veto for new members, and an 
explanatory requirement for each instance of veto use by a permanent 
member, this package of structural reforms yields a Security Council 
with increased legitimacy through greater representativeness, decreased 
possibility of substantive veto use in any one session, increased 
interactivity with the General Assembly, and increased transparency 
with rationales accompanying all veto usages. 
Returning to the central question posed by the editors for this 
symposium, one would expect to see extending from this suite of 
reforms a significant diminution in use of the veto power to protect 
states that commit mass atrocities.  Increased accountability through 
increased communication and transparency and increased 
representativeness through more regional representatives sitting as 
actual permanent members while only marginally increasing the size of 
the council is key to this outcome.  It is one thing for a permanent 
member to cast a veto to shield a reprehensible client state without 
consequence on a council where the members of the “club” have not 
changed in 70 years.77  It is quite another thing to cast that same veto 
looking eye-to-eye with another permanent member from the region 
where those atrocities are unfolding and explain yourself.  
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